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Northern Ireland was formed when the Anglo-Irish Treaty 
of 6 December 1921 partitioned Ireland into two political 
entities. Northern Ireland was formed from the predomi-
nantly Protestant six counties of the north, and remained 
an integral part of the United Kingdom. The majority of 
the island (the remaining twenty-six counties), which was 
predominantly Catholic, split from the United Kingdom. 
Initially this was known as the Irish Free State, and became 
the Republic of Ireland in 1949. Significant violence has 
occurred in almost every decade since the inception of 
Northern Ireland. However, the focus of this article will be 
the latest and most sustained period of violence that began 
in the late 1960s when claims by the Catholic population of 
Protestant discrimination in jobs, education, housing and 
local elections led to a civil rights campaign which quickly 
escalated into violence, resulting in the deployment of Brit-
ish troops in 1969 to try to restore order (Whyte 1990).
Over the last forty years, the conflict in Northern Ireland 
has been responsible for over 3,700 deaths and more than 
40,000 injuries, with civilians bearing the brunt of all 
deaths (53 percent) and injuries (68 percent) (Smyth 1998; 
Smyth and Hamilton 2004). The vast majority of deaths 
have been attributed to paramilitaries (87 percent of the 
total; 59 percent by Republicans, 28 percent by Loyalists), 
with a minority (about 11 percent of the total) caused by the 
security forces (Smyth 1998).
The Northern Ireland peace process, which began with the 
signing of the Downing Street Declaration in December 
1993, followed by the paramilitary ceasefires in 1994, and 
finally leading to the Good Friday Agreement in 1998, has 
resulted in a reduction in paramilitary activity, but not to 
a disappearance of violence. Paramilitary groups are still 
involved in murder and vigilante-style punishment attacks. 
We would like to acknowledge the financial support 
of the British Academy in conducting this research 
and the help of three anonymous reviewers in 
improving the manuscript. 
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Northern Ireland has endured a history of violence since its inception in 1922. The last forty years have been characterised by sustained political conflict and 
a fledging peace process. We conducted a series of interviews with individuals who had used violence to pursue political goals during the conflict. This article 
focuses on the processes involved in their joining of paramilitary groups and engaging in violent actions. The participants’ accounts resonate with factors that 
other researchers have identified as being antecedent to paramilitary membership, such as having the support of the immediate community (e. g., Crawford 
2003; Silke 2003). However, the rational decisions that are revealed in these accounts also show that participants engaged in rational decision making as 
opposed to being mindlessly provoked into membership in response to an environmental stimulus. These results highlight the degree to which individuals bear, 
and accept, personal responsibility for joining a paramilitary group (as opposed to membership simply being stimulated by uncontrollable dispositional or 
situational forces). 
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In conjunction with this violence, post-1998 Northern 
Ireland still suffers an annual cycle of dispute and civil dis-
order surrounding controversial Orange Order demonstra-
tions and increasing residential segregation (McKittrick et 
al. 2004, Police Service of Northern Ireland 2005; Shirlow 
2003).
The persistence of Northern Ireland’s Troubles (as the con-
flict is euphemistically known) and the long resistance to 
diplomatic or political intervention has been due to a clash 
“between a culture of violence and a culture of co-existence” 
(Darby 1997, 116). In other words, there is a proportion 
of Northern Ireland’s populace that embrace conflict and 
uphold their community’s paramilitary activists as heroes, 
while rejecting the peace process as a series of concessions 
to the other side. This clash of cultures has the potential to 
derail the current peace process in Northern Ireland and 
has prompted recent research to explore the processes in-
volved in joining a paramilitary group (Burgess, Ferguson, 
and Hollywood 2005a, 2005b) and the potential for future 
violence (Burgess, Ferguson, and Hollywood 2007). This 
article will begin by reviewing the research exploring the 
antecedents of militant activism in Northern Ireland before 
progressing to discuss an important additional factor 
which was extracted from an analysis of face-to-face inter-
views with current and former Northern Irish paramilitar-
ies conducted by the authors. This additional dimension 
involves a process initiated by exposure to direct or indirect 
political violence, which stimulates a period of deep reflec-
tion resulting in the individual committing themselves to 
engage in political violence to change their current circum-
stances.
1. The Road to Militant Activism
It must be noted that paramilitary groups in Northern 
Ireland are not irregular militias who assist the regular 
military, as in the common definition of the term. The 
Northern Irish paramilitary groups that are the focus of 
this article, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the Ulster 
Volunteer Force (UVF), are armed insurgent groups whose 
members are viewed by supporters as “resistance fighters” 
or “counter-terrorists” and by opponents as “terrorists”. 
Research focusing on the reasons why people join armed 
insurgent groups or commit acts of terrorism has generally 
explored intra-individual explanations, with terrorists be-
ing labelled or diagnosed as mad or sociopathic (for review, 
see Silke 1998). Traditionally they have been seen as pos-
sessing psychological disorders that make them capable of 
committing murderous atrocities (see Horgan 2003; Silke 
1998 for reviews). However, there is a growing awareness 
that these reductionist explanations based on individual 
abnormality are inadequate and are often no more than 
wishful thinking (Burgess, Ferguson, and Hollywood 2005a, 
2005b; Horgan 2003; Louis and Taylor 2002; Oberschall 
2004; Silke 1998; Victoroff 2005). Darley (1999) indicates 
that these cognitive strategies are founded on a general 
motivation to view the majority of society as normal, and 
therefore non-threatening, thereby making us able to con-
sider ourselves predominantly safe.
Victoroff ’s recent review of the research (2005) suggests 
that an understanding of violent insurgency requires a 
more comprehensive analysis than has traditionally been 
undertaken. In addition to intra-individual factors, such an 
analysis would need to incorporate wider social factors and 
the dynamics of the conflict. Reviews of research on terror-
ism (Silke 1998, 2001; Victoroff 2005) have also exposed the 
shortcomings of terrorism research, generally concluding 
that the quality and validity of the research is poor. For ex-
ample, 80 percent of studies relied on the secondary analy-
sis of data from journals, books, or other media for their 
findings, while only 13 percent of data are derived from 
interviews with terrorists (Silke 2001). Despite these meth-
odological shortcomings, research with individuals from 
insurgency groups from across the globe has consistently 
uncovered an inventory of factors that increase the likeli-
hood of participation in a campaign of violence. Some of 
our own previous work has supported the efficacy of these 
factors, which include: (a) The existence of a grievance or 
perceived injustice by a sub-group of the population (see 
Burgess, Ferguson, and Hollywood 2005b for first hand 
accounts; Crenshaw 2003); (b) Age and gender (terrorist 
acts are generally committed by young males aged 15 to 25) 
(Silke 2003); (c) Past family involvement with or support 
for the movement (promoting membership through his-
torical connections within the family) (Burgess, Ferguson, 
and Hollywood 2005b; Crawford 2003); (d) Community 
support for the insurgent group, or high status associated 
with membership of the group (Burgess, Ferguson, and 
 IJCV : Vol. 2 (1) 2008, pp. 130 –137Neil Ferguson et al. : Crossing the Rubicon 133
Hollywood 2007; Post, Sprinzak, and Denny 2003); (e) 
Coercion or conscription into the movement (Bruce 1992); 
(f) Eventual membership as the result of an incremental 
process of increasing acts of insurgence (Burgess, Ferguson, 
and Hollywood 2005a); this process may start with rela-
tively mundane behaviour such as spray painting, before 
progressing to destroying property and finally becoming 
involved in injuring and killing opponents (Oberschall 
2004). (g) Vengeance as the individual’s motivation, feels 
a need to hit back and right wrongs (Burgess, Ferguson, 
and Hollywood 2005a, 2005b, 2007; Crenshaw 2003; Silke 
2003). And finally (h), obviously to become a member of 
an armed group there must be an organisation that the 
individual has the opportunity to join, and that wants his 
or her membership (Silke 2003). These studies indicate the 
complexity involved in trying to unpick how the anteced-
ent conditions impact on the individual. This study aims 
to explore the role of the risk factors involved in joining 
armed paramilitary groups in Northern Ireland.
2. Method
Our research is based on face-to-face interviews with para-
militaries or former paramilitaries. In keeping with previ-
ous research on complex issues that directly impact the 
lives of individual participants (Smith 1995), interpretative 
phenomenological analysis (IPA) was used in the current 
study as the analytical methodological tool. IPA is con-
cerned with how people think or what people believe about 
the topic under discussion and is particularly appropriate 
for detailed studies of small groups and for research that 
addresses decision-making processes of participants. IPA is 
based upon Husserl’s phenomenology whereby the experi-
ence of individuals is privileged in the research endeavour 
(Smith 1996). The IPA approach acknowledges that a “real 
world” exists, but attempts to gain an insider’s perspective 
of the living conditions and experiences prior to engag-
ing in a more critical and abstract interrogative process of 
interpretation.
The authors conducted a detailed analysis of each interview, 
annotating and coding each participant’s transcript fully 
before starting the next one. Broad themes were developed 
for each transcript in turn and these themes became more 
focused with successive readings of the transcripts and 
construction of code summary documents. This system of 
analysis is in line with Smith’s second recommendation of 
analyzing interview data from groups (1996). In this case, 
summary documents of master codes were determined for 
each individual without attempting to read the next indi-
vidual’s transcript. This was done to reduce the tendency 
of codes from one interview to completely determine the 
construction of themes identified in subsequent transcripts. 
Eventually, a set of superordinate master themes was 
achieved by identifying relevant extracts across all partici-
pants. Rereading the transcripts and summary documents 
helped the researchers to identify themes that were re-
peated across individuals and to identify themes that were 
specific to particular individuals. The overall list of themes 
included such issues as abuse of authority, denial of basic 
human rights, support of the wider community, and aware-
ness of risk. Here, we present a subset of the themes that 
most directly address participants’ interpretations of how 
they became involved in paramilitary violence. We also 
draw on interviews conducted with peaceful campaigners 
in order to illustrate the points we make.
3. Analysis and Discussion
Although our previous findings support many of the above 
inventory of terrorist induction, and most of the inter-
viewees demonstrated an accumulation of these expected 
antecedent factors, we would like to point out here how 
participants’ accounts also add another important dimen-
sion to eventual membership in a paramilitary group. We 
interviewed eight members of the IRA and eight members 
of the UVF and discovered that in addition to this list of 
risk factors, the interviewees had each instigated their vio-
lent activism after a critical incident that had precipitated a 
period of reflection in the potential new recruit. Such criti-
cal incidents generally involved a notable example of unjust 
victimisation at the hands of an outgroup. So, for those 
living in a Catholic community, examples would include 
being attacked by the British military. For those living in 
a Protestant community, examples would include being 
attacked by members of the IRA. On the face of it this type 
of experience may appear to fall neatly into the seventh of 
the above inventory, hitting back in vengeance. Our con-
cern is that such a simple way of describing paramilitary 
membership may suggest almost a stimulus-response 
relationship between perceived injustice and action. To 
view the relationship between victimisation and paramili-
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tary membership in this way may mask the sophistication 
of the processes individuals engage in prior to committing 
themselves (or not committing themselves) to a period of 
sustained violent action. It may also underplay the degree 
to which individuals are responsible for their own deci-
sion to join a paramilitary group. In the following section 
we draw on interview excerpts to illustrate participants’ 
experiences. 
For each of the participants these critical incidents were 
attacks on themselves, their family or their wider commu-
nity. For example a former member of the UVF decided to 
become involved in terrorism after he heard that a young 
man with the same name, age and background as him 
had been killed by one of the twenty-two bombs the IRA 
exploded on Bloody Friday in 1972. He explains the impact 
this had on him:
  And I thought, “That’s my fence sitting days over,” and 
I joined the UVF. And there’s so many stories like that 
where you talk to Republicans or Loyalists and you find 
out there was a moment. There was a moment when 
they crossed the Rubicon.
The demographics of this participant did indeed fit with 
many of the antecedents described earlier. He was a young 
man living in a community that would be supportive of 
his action and he knew that the UVF existed and would 
welcome his membership. The following account though is 
from a young woman (less typically associated with para-
military activity) and she indicates how her experience led 
her to decide to join an opposing paramilitary group, the 
IRA, after witnessing police and security forces violently 
engaging a group of protestors:
  . . . a lot of [peacefully protesting] women and chil-
dren would have been beaten with batons and it was 
just messy. You begin to think, “this is not good” . . . I 
decided in ‘69 when the troubles really began and I’d 
watched a lot of people being hurt and a lot of friends 
die for standing up for what they believed in. I quickly, 
not through anger, but through sadness and fear, de-
cided, “OK, I’ll take up this cause and I’ll try and bring 
change”.
We can see that these accounts mark decisions being made 
rather than these individuals mindlessly responding to 
unfortunate environmental events. This is once again 
underlined in the account of a young man (at that time) 
who engaged in a sustained period of reflection prior to 
joining the IRA. He had run to help a teenage boy who 
had been shot by an army sniper. The boy died and the 
participant described withdrawing to an abandoned build-
ing for a period of hours in order to decide how to act. He 
explained this incident as being one in a series that had 
had an impact on him, but the first that had made him 
stop in such a deliberate fashion and consider joining the 
IRA. This type of experience is echoed in the comments of 
another member of the UVF, also a young man at the time 
of the re-emergence of violence in the late 1960s and early 
1970s. Despite originally having no intention to become 
involved in the conflict, incidents such as the death of a 
former school friend (the first policeman to be killed in the 
modern conflict) were significant milestones on his journey 
to eventually deciding to engage in paramilitary activity: 
  I can remember things like running down the street, my 
father was in the British Legion the night the first big 
bomb went off in the town and I was running down the 
street expecting him, and I remember the relief when  
I seen him walking down past the fire station you know 
and he was OK. And all those things just impacted on 
you and there’s no religious or political motivation for it 
at that time, it was just purely personal.
In a sense, there is no way of being certain which incidents 
will impact a person to deliberate about whether they will 
join a paramilitary group. Indeed Jaspers (1970) believes 
that this analysis may be outside the realm of objective 
scientific study. However, the larger incidents, such as the 
Bloody Friday bombings and the Bloody Sunday shoot-
ings will probably increase the chances that some will 
engage in just this type of deliberation. This point was also 
mentioned by many of the non-combatants we interviewed. 
They also recognized that critical incidents acted to fuel 
recruitment into Northern Irish paramilitary groups. In 
one interview a peaceful civil rights activist remarked how 
large-scale violent confrontation provided people with a 
critical incident that increased IRA membership:
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  It’s easy, after Bloody Sunday, for ten or twenty young 
fellas to be so angry. They’ve seen their mates shot and 
they go down and see about joining the IRA.
Another non-violent individual, though, gives us a greater 
understanding of the very personal nature of the deci-
sion to join a violent campaign. This individual had lost a 
brother in the Bloody Sunday march. Yet his contemplation 
of action took him in a different direction to similar young 
men in his neighbourhood. He said:
  You felt you had to help through that whole period of 
time. I would not carry a gun. I’ve never had a gun in 
my hand in my life. I’ve experienced the pain of losing 
someone and I wouldn’t wish it on anyone else.
It is clear that people can experience the same objective 
victimisation yet react differently and that reaction may not 
simply be due to the number of “risk factors” a person has 
(e.g., being a young male within a supportive community), 
but critically also involves the volition of the individual. In 
this sense the members of paramilitary groups are truly 
more responsible (and generally our participants acknowl-
edge this) for their actions than research that focuses on 
dispositional factors (for a review see Silke 1998) or simple 
responses to environmental circumstances (e.g., Zimbardo 
2004) may have suggested.
These quotes illustrate how the use of military force to 
tackle problems may lead to more violence, creating the 
destructive spiral that Crenshaw labels an “action-reaction 
syndrome” that serves to fuel further conflict (2003, 95). It 
should also be remembered that in the cases cited above 
the individual was not the target of the aggression. All that 
was needed was that s/he identified with the person or per-
sons who were subjected to the violence and s/he perceived 
this assault as an injustice to them and their wider com-
munity.
Burgess et al. (2005a; 2005b) also demonstrated that it is 
not simple exposure to these events that results in taking 
up arms. Indeed, many of the participants who suffered 
from indirect and direct violent experiences did not join 
paramilitary groups. Instead they became involved in peace 
work or civil protest or simply did nothing. Previous re-
search shows that only a small section of the populace take 
up arms regardless of the brutality and oppression they 
collectively face (Crenshaw 2003; Silke 2003). All of our 
interviewees who took action, whether peaceful or violent, 
reported periods of reflection after these critical incidents 
during which the individual consciously considered how 
he or she would act to change the status quo, or hit back at 
those who were threatening their community. This act of 
reflection is an important consideration as many insurgents 
project a view that they had no choice, that the socio-
political conditions forced them to use violence (Crenshaw 
2003). The fact that these individuals do make a conscious 
decision to engage in terrorism is further demonstrated 
by the fact that not everyone from an oppressed and/or 
victimised community engages in terrorism, serving to 
underline the essential personal choice involved in becom-
ing a paramilitary. These findings have support from two 
other recent studies. In a study of why adolescents join 
legitimate and illegal armed groups across the globe Brett 
and Specht (2004) interviewed fifty-three adolescent males 
and females from nine armed groups involved in various 
conflicts across the globe in addition to young serving Brit-
ish soldiers. While the key factors involved in their inter-
viewees deciding to join an armed group (ranging from the 
LTTE to the Mojahedin) map very clearly to the antecedent 
factors listed previously, they also note the importance of 
a critical moment, (such as the death of a family member 
or having their homes come under attack) in distinguish-
ing those who decide to join an armed group from their 
peers who do not. Additionally, Talari’s interviews with six 
incarcerated Indian Islamic insurgents (2007) also suggest-
ed that particular socio-political incidents (e.g. the Babri 
Mosque demolition and the communal riots in Gujarat) 
the interviewees had experienced acted as the key turning 
points in their lives as they made the transition from civil-
ian to insurgent. It was the change in attitudes, motivations, 
emotions caused by these events that began their trans-
formation into a violent insurgent, not their prior religious 
beliefs or exposure to radicalisation processes. Indeed the 
philosopher Jaspers (1970) recognises the importance of the 
“grenzsituationen” or boundary situations created by having 
to deal with a situation that prior knowledge or rational ob-
jective reasoning cannot prepare a person to overcome. Jas-
pers believed having to deal with these boundary situations 
(such as facing death, the death of a child, or an inevitable 
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struggle) causes a radical change in an individual’s thinking, 
rousing them from normal spontaneous instinctive think-
ing, creating a radical change in personality and world view 
in which they take responsibility for their new future, and 
that is confirmed by the experiences reported by the partici-
pants in our study (see Salamun 1998 and 2006 for further 
discussion of Jaspers’ philosophical conceptions).
As noted, the interviews point to intra-individual causes 
based on the decision-making processes experienced by 
an individual following a critical incident, which combine 
with demographic characteristics such as age, gender, em-
ployment status, level of education, and family and social 
history. Another important ingredient that is added to this 
mix involves the dynamics of the violence, with our inter-
viewees reporting that the use of violence on communities 
will be reciprocated with violence from some members of 
that community, while other members will offer support 
and succour. This indicates that terrorism is not simply a 
precursor of military intervention but also a likely result of 
perceived injustice and violent oppression. 
This data adds to a growing understanding of the complexity 
involved in attributing the causes for terrorism. These find-
ings build on previous research and illustrate that normal 
people can choose to do abnormal things (such as engage in 
terrorist activity) under abnormal circumstances (Crenshaw 
2003; Silke 1998, 2003; Horgan 2003). The data generated is 
based on semi-structured interviews with individuals who 
were involved in armed insurgency, rather than following 
an approach based on secondary accounts or an analysis of 
open source material, therefore this study addresses some of 
the shortcomings common in this area of research (see Silke 
2003; Horgan 2003; Victoroff 2005). Also the findings pro-
vide a new and novel avenue for further enquiry which may 
go some way to addressing the concern that to fully under-
stand why people engage in insurgent activities the research 
needs to focus on the dynamics occurring at the intersec-
tion between psychological dispositions, prior experiences, 
socialization and the external environment (Crenshaw 1986; 
Victoroff 2005).
4. Conclusion
The findings offered support for most of the antecedent 
factors linked with involvement in armed insurgency (such 
as living in a community supportive of the use of political 
violence and having access to armed groups that welcomed 
their membership; see Burgess, et al., 2005a, 2005b; Craw-
ford 2003; Crenshaw 2003; Oberschall 2004; Post et al., 
2003; Silke 2003 for more detail), with the exception that 
none of our participants were coerced or conscripted into a 
paramilitary organization; all were volunteers who actively 
decided to seek membership of an armed group after wit-
nessing a critical incident.
Importantly the findings also demonstrate that the individ-
ual has agency and plays an active role in determining the 
boundaries of their own actions. The findings also indicate 
that acts of political violence are not the acts of “evil” men, 
and neither are they due to purely switching on and off so-
cial situational factors as proposed by Zimbardo (2004, 47) 
in which the social circumstances in which the interviewees 
were immersed acts as “a barrel filled with vinegar [which] 
will always transform sweet cucumbers into sour pickles 
– regardless of the best intentions, resilience, and genetic 
nature of those cucumbers”. 
Instead the findings suggest that researchers should move 
towards researching and potentially manipulating the 
decision making processes an individual experiences when 
faced with a critical incident or boundary situation which 
causes them to self-reflect and imagine an altered future in 
which they purposely challenge the status quo and strive to 
act in a manner which will alter the socio-political situa-
tion. A deeper understanding of these processes which take 
place after a critical incident will help build a better picture 
of how the antecedent factors combine with the individual 
to produce someone who is willing to alter their social-
political environment through violent confrontation with 
those who are challenging them, their family or the wider 
community they identify with.
In addition to suggesting this potential new avenue for 
research, the findings also address some of the limitations 
common to this area of research (see Horgan 2003; Silke 
2003; Victoroff 2005) and demonstrate the complexities 
involved in attributing the causes for terrorism.
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